This discussion raises a nu1nberojissues related to the introduction of the econonzic torts into
Introduction
The award of$1 .66 million in dan1ages to the Ford Motor Co Ltd in the recent case of Ford Motor Co Ltd v Northern Storepersons IUW( 19H7) . although shortlived. did focus attention on the potential impact that the common law economic torts could have for labour law and industrial relations in New Zealand. The scheme of the Labour Relations Act 19X7 also makes the application of these torts in New Zealand labour law of renewed importance as they have now gained the imprin1atur of statutory recognition and have become one of the two sanctions against unlawful industrial action and arguably by far the most effective of the remedies available to an employer to utilise if recourse is to be had to the law as a means of settling or combating strikes.
The one 4uestion that does not seen1 to have been seriously considered either in the 17 years since the common law was first utilised in 1970. or during the debate leading up to the l9X7 labour law reforms is whether or not such an in1portant aspect of New Zealand's industrial relations system should be governed hy a system of law that has been developed in the very different environment of the United Kingdom and by a judiciary that had no reason to contemplate its effect in New Zealand. and who. even if the thought had occurred. would almost certainly have acted no differently.
Legal transplants
Comparative lawyers have long recognised that the transplantation of the elements of one country·s legal system to that of another can cause difficulties for the recipient's legal system. For this reason caution and careful evaluation have been urged before any such transplant is carried out. A significant exception to this rule however. has been the reception of English common law throughout much of the Comn1onwealth. It seems to have been assumed that this law will remain compatible with the different political and social systems that make up the common law world and that local courts can make such adjustments as are necessary to accommodate peculiar local conditions. In most cases this has proved to be true. hut in general it has also been the case that the common law arrived with the colonists of the various common law countries who largely adopted English law in its totality. Developments in the con1 n1on law have thus been integrated into the local legal systen1 as the local system itself developed taking the common law changes into account.
The question that is raised by the introduction of the common law economic torts into New Zealand's labour law is whether an area of law that has developed in a direction quite different from that ofBritain. and over the same time period. can readily receive a transplant of common law rules that have been developed essentially in the context of the British industrial relations system and in a foreign political and legal environment. It is suggested in this discussion that th e reception of the economic torts into New Zealand's labour law should have been subjected to the same critical analysis that would have been expected of any other substantial legal change and that the principles that would apply to a statutory transplant are equally applicable to such a major change brought about by the courts through the application of the common law.
Problems with transplants
Warnings on the dangers of compa rative work in labour law and industrial relations are not uncommon. Ka ssalow ( 1968) for exa mple has said :
Without a fair unders tanding of the social economic and political setting of the industrial relations system in a given coun try one can make e rrors of analysis or judgment. or. even more likely. lea rn on ly half truths about the significance of particular industrial relations policies or practices in foreign countries. ( 196X. p. 99).
Sch regie ( 19X I) has discussed the pitfalls of con1 parativc studies in some deta i I and in particular draws attention to the issue of whether that which is being compared is in fact coo1parablc. One particular danger he points out is that superficial sirnilarities may be misleading and that the use of comn1on terminology can conceal considerable variations in the underlying concepts and practices. This point is particularly valid in comparing LOmn1on law rules where the tern1inology and concepts ren1ain con~tant from country to country even though the underlying social system that supported the derivation of a concept n1ay he quite different.
One of the leading con1parative lawyers of recent tinh~s. Professor Kahn-Frcund. has addressed the specific prohlcn1 of lega l tran splants in labour law in an article. nan1ed appropriately On uses and nlL\·ues ojcon1parative law ( Kahn-Freu nd. 1974). Kahn-Freund argued that th e task of tran splanting hccon1cs n1ore difficult as power relationships hecorne n1orc dorninant:
But then~ is a third political clement. and in many ways from a practical point ofvicw the most important. It is the enormously increased role which is played hy organised interests in the making and in the maintenance of legal institutions. Anyone contemp lating the usc of foreign legislation for law making in his country must ask himself: how far does this rule or institution owe its existence or its continued existenl:e to a distribution of power in the foreign country that we do not share'! H ow far would it be accepted and how far rejected hy the organised groups which. in the political sense are part of our constitution '! ( 1974. p. 12) These questions. while addressed to th ose con ternplating legislative transplants. could equally have been addressed to those judges see king to introduce rnajor c hanges through the common law. Kahn-Freund stresses the perhaps obv ious fact that collective industrial relations in particular arc closely linked with the stru ct ure of socia l and political power in their own particular cnvironrnent. His discussion was n1adc in the particular context of the Industrial Relati ons Act llJ71 (UK) and he attributes rna ny of the failures of that Act to the failure of the govcrnrnent to appreciate the significant structural and legal differences between the United States and Britain which rnadc the introduction of the n1orc forn1al and legalis tic United States rnodel s inappropriate.
Kahn-Freund's vie\\~ have however been challenged. particularly by Watson ( 1976) . Watso n argues that succes~fultransplants depend not or1 the power structure oft he donor cou ntl)' hut on that of th e recipient and he states:
What, in my opinion. the law reformer s hould he after in looking at foreign systems was an ulea which could he transformed into part of the law of his coun try. For this a sys tema tic knowledge of the law or political ~tructure oft he donor ystem was not ncccessary ... . ( 1976. p. 79 ) Economic torts in labour law 91 \Vatson doe · not however advocate uninformed transplants: he rather places a different emphasis on the country that should he studied to ensure the viahility of the transplant. In countering Kahn-Fn:u nd's ex arn ple of the Industrial Relations Act. Watson hlan1es its failures not on its United States origins hut on the power structure in British industry.
The particular point to be derived from the introduction of the economic torts into New Zealand's labour law is that not only were the considerations outlined above unheeded hut they Jo not sc~rn even to have been considered as particularly relevant, such is the n1ystique of the universa l applicability of the cornn1on law.
The reception ofco/Jlnton law into New Zealand
The ~xtent to which the New Zealand courts can regulate the transmission of the common law a developed outside New Zealand or rnodify it for New Zealand conditions is a question that. in rec~nt tin1cs. ha s hecon1e so rnewhat controversial. In a recent discussion of the position. McHugh ( llJ~7) These decision~ ~t:ern to heavily ljlla I i fy the ex tent of the discretion that th~ New Zealand courts have to depart frorn ··English·· law and it would see n1 that until app~ab to the Privy Council are abolished NC\\ Zealand law will he forced to devt:lop in the s hadow oft he English con1mon Ia\\ . The oun ofAppeal has however dernonstrated a willingness to depart fron1 the comn1on law on ~orne occasions when it helieves that sig nificant differences exist in N~w Zealand LOnditions. One clear t:Xan1pk in labour law was in North Island J,Vholesale Grocerie.s Luh• Hewin ( 1982) where th~ English rul~s on taking account of tax in cornputing da1nagcs were held to be inapprop riate in New Zealand.
In the cas~s introducing the econon1ic torts into New Zealand Ia hour law the question of local circu1nstances did not arise and it is only recentl y that the courts se~n1 to have considered then1 (.111 issue. Even had the question arisen. however. ther~ would se~n1 to be only lirnited roon1 for an independ~nt d~vcloprnent of th e law. should th~ courts have chosen to pursue such a devt:loprnenl. As is discussed below. an) chang~ in the econon1ic torts to adapt to industrial co nOict would aln1ost certainly need to go to the root of their underlying princi pies.
The development of New Zealand and British strike law \Vh en New Zealand adopted a systern ofcornpulsory conciliation and arbitration in 1894 labour law in the t\VO cou ntri~s began to diverge and to develop on quite different patterns and with quite clifft:rent philosophies of the role of law in industrial relations. The New Zealand ~yste rn is one that derives all of its essential forrn fron1 its statutory base: the bargaining systen1 ts laid down hy sta tute. union s derive hoth their existence and legal status largely fron1 statute and th e enforcctncnt oft he sys tcn1 is laid down by statute. The law. and in particular statutory law. permeates the whole sys tcn1 while the con1n1on law has been largely peripheral.
By contrast the British system of industrial relations has been characterised as one of legal abstentionisn1. Its procedures. its organisation and its practices have been developed by the parties largely without government intervention and it is only in the last two decades that statutory intervention has assumed major importance. Until recently the major intervention by statute was intended to protect the industrial relations system from the potentially devastating intrusion of the common law.
A point that should be kept in mind is that the development of British strike law was conten1poraneous with that in New Zealand. In moving to its statute-based arbitration system New Zealand did not displace a matured system of common law rules. In 1894 the common law had only just began to develop a response to the emergence of industrial unionism. In 1894 it was less than 20 years since British unions had gained protection from the criminal law of conspiracy and the cases defining the liability of unions in tort for strike action had yet to be decided. The con1n1on law as it affects strikes is not only a peculiarly British development and a reaction to British circun1stances but it is an area oflaw that entirely postdates the separation of New Zealand's law fron1 that of Britain.
Strike law in Ne·w Zealand
In l X94 the New Zealand legislature passed the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act which signalled a n1ajor break with not only the British pattern of industrial relations but also with its law governing industrial relations. In the period since IX94 New Zealand has evolved tts own systen1 oflaw and practice to deal with the problems of industrial conflict. For most of this period strikes have been proscribed by statute but after the problems of enforcing antitrike law were den1onstrated during the 1908 Blackball strike. the attempt to enforce legal ~anctions against individual strikes or strikers was gradually abandoned. An acceptance or at least tolerance ofstri kes developed with state sanctions being reserved for significant threats to the systern such as occurred in 1912-13 and 1951.
When concern with the numberofstrikes emerged in the 1960s the solution was seen not in tenns of penal rneasures hut in in1proved procedures to enable the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970 introduced sin1ple procedures for the settletnent of disputes of rights and set up the mediation service to aid peaceful settlen1ents. reforn1s that were consolidated in the Industrial Relations Act 1973. In 1976 however penalties were reintroduced into the Act by the National Govcrntnent. The final act in the saga of crin1inal sanctions for strikes came in 1977-7S when the lessons of Blackball were learned again in the Ocean Beach prosecution debacle (see Walsh. 19X3) . The subsequent [)unlop Report( 1978) recon1n1ended that all strike penalties be made a civil matter. a recommendation that was speedily adopted in the Industrial Relations Amendment Act l97X .
It was in this decade. when statutory strike law was beginning to assume a rational form. that the cconon1ic torts rnade their entry into labour law and over the next decade and a half became an increasingly in1portant factor in many industrial conflicts. This development occurred n1oreoverwithout any real consideration of the nature of what was happening. In the period between 1970 and 19X7 the Court of Appca I has l:Onsidered the issue of economic torts in labour law only twice. both on interlocutory applications rather than full hearings.
The Labour Relations Act 19X7 has continued the legislative trend of the 1970s and all direct penalties for striking have been rernovcd fron1 the Act. The ren1edies available to an employer arc either a con1pliance order or an action in tort for an injunction or damages or both. Thus, fron1 being outside the n1ainstrean1 of labour law in New Zealand. the economic torts have hecornc a centrepiece of the new legislation. The unanswered question ren1ains however: \vhat is the nature of this law and what is its suitability for New Zealand conditio ns?
To undcr~tand the con1n1on law econon1ic torts as they apply to industrial conflkt in the later par.t of thi s century one n1ust go back to developments in the period leading up to the Trade D ts pu tes Act 1906 (UK). In 1 R7 5, at the ti rne of the ren1oval of the last remnants of direct cri~inal penalties aga~~st ~ni?~s for striking. the n1odern economic torts barely existed.
Thtrty years later the Bnttsh JUdtctary had developed the law to a position that threatened both the effectivent: sand continued viability of the trade union rnoven1ent in Britain. Jenks ( l92R. p. 337) The subsequent dcvcloprncnts in both the cornrnon law and in statute after 1906 arc \\'ell known and will not be discussed here (see Elias & Ewing. 19R2 and Davies & Freedland. 1984a for a discussion oft he n1odern position). What is of interest for this discussion is the effect that these and su bse4 uent devclopn1en ts have had on the shape of the con1n1on law. It will be suggested that the rnodern con1n1on law is the result of a particular and peculiar set ofh istorical and ideological circurnstances uni4ue to Britain. and that as a conse4ucnce. this law n1ust be treated with great caution in any other legal systern.
The srrucrure of Brirish strike law
Modern British strike law consists oft\\'O distinct parts and without an appreciation of this the con1n1on law cannot he placed in its proper perspective. The t\VO parts are:
The con1111on law which. through the economic torts. contains a set of rules which in certain circurnstances render one person liable for econon1ic dan1age inllicted on another. The fact that these torts have developed largely in cases involving industrial conflict. and in an atrnosphere of judicial hostility both to unions and to industrial conflict has resulted in thoseca rryingout industrial action being particularly vulnerable to an action in tort.
(2)
The statutory in11nun ities which protect those engaged in industrial action frornliability in tort regulate liahilit) rather than the con1nHH1 law and changes in policy towards industrial conllict are irnplen1cnted through changes to these in1n1unities. Thus the Thatcher Governn1cnfs restrictions on the right to take industrial action have been implemented through narrowing the irnrnunitics and thus allowing an incre·tscd scope for the application of the con1 n1on law. These two elen1ents interact to forn1 the rnodcrn law governing strikes. and the responses of both Parlian1ent and the judiciary have reflected developn1ents by the other.
The development of the common law
Since 1906 the con1n1on law has been ahle to develop on the prernise that the lirnits on a union's ability to strike are principally a question for Parliament to decide. although on occasion~ the judiciary has atten1pted to narrow the irnrnunities by giving then1 a restrictive interpretation. The tnost recent atten1pts. prirnarily by Lord Denning in the 1970s were however firm ly repulsed by the House of Lords (sec [)a vies & . The con11non law itself has seen a gradual broadening of the scope of liability over the years. the n1o t pectacular example being the "rediscovery .. of the tort ofintin1idation in Rooke.L ,." B~rnard( 1964), a case whose only rationale seern to have been to avoid the statutory irnn1un-1t1es.
What the judiciary has not had to do in it. cornrnon law jurisidction is to consider to what extent indu trial action should forn1 a defence to an action at con1n1on law. Without statutory intervention it is inconceivable that this issue would not have become significant over the last 80 years. The question of defences to the common law has arisen on some occasions and in particular in the Crofter 4 case where the industrial objects of a trade union were accepted as providing a defence of justification to an action in tort, although a similar defence had long been available where business motives were at issue. This case is however something of an exception and in general: "Instead of drawing a line between justifiable and unjustifiable pressure the con1n1on law has prefered the less controversial distinction between what is lawful and what is unlawful" (Elias & Ewing 1982 p. 326) .
Statutory immunities have skewed the development of the common law so that the balanced law that one might have expected to see en1erge has. except in the case of conspiracy. failed to rnaterialise. It is this skewed development. in particular, that is of concern when the law is transplanted to New Zealand. The statutory immunities have meant that the judges have not had to face the difficult questions.
It is interesting. by way of contrast. to compare the development of the law in the Federal Republic ofGern1any which is based on provisions in the Civil Code analogous to the law of tort. German law has never been particularly tolerant of strikes but it has nevertheless been left to the courts to detern1ine the parameters oflawful strike action. The solutions may be regarded as unduly legalistic and restrictive. but the courts have had to attempt to construct a system of law that takes a reasonably realistic view of industrial realities. (see Mueckenberger. 1986 on the Gennan systern ).
Judicia] attiludes
The hostility of the British judiciary to trade unions. to collective ideals and to industrial conflict has been described so often that it n1ay almost be regarded as a truisn1 of labour law. I he n1yth ofjudicial irnpartiality has been severely shaken if not destroyed by Griffith ( 1985) . His book. which generated considerable hostility at the time came. according to The rea~on s for thi s hostility seen1 generally to be attributed to two causes. the first being the class origins of the judges and their acceptance and support for the values and prejudices of that class (sec Griffith. 1<;)~5). Several writers in recent years have atten1pted to ~how that the \Vhole of labour Ia\\ . both individual and collective. is affected by a particular judicial view of the cn1ployn1ent relationship and one that is generally hostile to workers and their organisations (sec for exarnplc Forrest. 1980 : Griffiths. 1985 .
The second reason however is more con1plex and relates to the structure of British labour law. This argurnent also has relevance to New Zealand particularly in view of the recent legislative changes. The argun1ent is essentially that the statutory imn1unities place unions above the law and so give then1 a privileged position. This argun1ent. as Clark & Wedderburn point out (I <;)XJ. p. 16R ). depends on a particular view of the law that sees legislation as intruding on the "real " law and as restricting the legal rights ofernployers. This argun1ent is not confined ~o Britain ~r to ll. _tbou~ law .. ~a~ton A C J fo~ ex~~n1ple used this argun1ent to )ustify a restrictive tnterpretallon of the Conclltatton and Arbttratton Acts (Australia) in 1913.-A sin1ilar attitude i~ also apparent in the subrnission~ of the New Zealand Business Roundtable on the Governn1ent_'s Gr~e.n Paper.~ 19X6. pp. 5J 1.41 ). In this suhrnission it is argued that a return to .. simple and tntelltgthlc law would solve n1any ot the prohlen1s that the Roundtable perceives in industrial relation s. an argun1ent that not only seerns to irnply a vision ofson1e .. golden age .. of the cornn1on Ia\\' hut which, n1ore in1portantly. also ignores its con1plexity and its unprcdicta b iIi ty. · This argurnent contains a nun1ber of flaws both in principle and in fact. The first is the notion that comrnon law has some special character that places it above n1ere .. political .. (ie legislated) law. Such a view not only attacks the concept of democratic government but is also a • facade for the defenu~ of a particular conception of rights that has been developed hy the con1 n1o n I aw cou rb. a conception founded ti nn lyon individuaL property-hased values and on a particular notion of freedorn of contraLt. As Kahn-Freund has said ... Nothing is rnore rniskading than the a1nhiguity of the word ·rreedon1· in labour relations" ( 1977. p. 12). The argurnentthal unions. are in sorne way above the law is also rnisleading although il has been raised ever si nee the original Trade l)ispu tes Act (see for exam pie l)icey. 1963. p. xI vi and the views of present judges quoted in Clark & Wedderhurn. 19X3, p. 170) . The argurnent of course relate:-; to the corllrllon law. not the law as a whole. and contrary to what is asserted. this is not a condition uni4ue to unions. Investors of capital for example arc given in1n1unity fron1 insolvency laws ifthey invest through a lirnited liability cornpany. The fact is that the con1n1on Ia\\ i:s not a perlect instrurnent and that the operation of society often re4uires particular rules for part iL u Ia r groups to he forn1 u la ted in the I igh t of changing social and econon1 ic conditions. The systern of in1n1unities in Britain is Britain's way of providing the legal basis for effective trade unionisn1 and for protecting the collective rights of workers. It is unfortunate perhaps t h at t h i s h as he e n d t > n c h y a s t? r it? s of n ega t i v e i rntll u n it i e s rat her t h a n a p o s i t i v e set o f rig h t s as is cornrnon for exatllpk in continental jurisdictions. The technique ernployed in Britain has had the unfortunah.: effect of distorting the debate on this aspect oflahour la\v and shifting its focus away frorn the centra l issue ofv.'hat are the legititnate rights of trade unions (see further Clark & Wedderburn. llJX3 and Kahn-Freund. 1977) . It is of interest that. while New Zealand has no\\ also adopted a systcn1 ofin1n1unities. the staternent of objects for the relevant part of the La hour Relation 1\ct docs state the positive objeLt to .. establish that ... The right of workers to strike ..
The ho til it) generated b) these beliefs has heavily influenced subse4uent developrnents in Britain. Part I) thi · has heen seen in atternpts to avoid the Trade Disputes Acts or to restrict their application (see Clark & \Vedderbu rn. llJ!\3 and G ri ffi th 19X5) but n1ore i Ill porta n tly frorn the point of view of Nc\\ Zealand labour law. it is one of the principal factors that has led to the skewed developrnent of the cornn1on law.
Again frorn the Ne'' Zealand perspective one nntst ask whether it is appropriate in a New Zealand context to accept a systcn1 of law incorporating these attitudes.
The reception of the common law into New Zealand One oft he n1ore interesting aspects oft he introduction oft he eco non1 ic tut1s in to Ia bou r law in New Zealand was that the\ could he received with virtually no judicial ex~tTnination and
with little or no debate b\: the court~ of the issues raised above. Indeed such issues rllaV as well "' not have existed. such is the n1ytholobrY of the universality of the C01nn1on law. The assurnption wast hat the law was applicable. and neither courts nor counsel secn1ed prep a ru.lto argue tot he contrary. Even in the n1ost recent case. New Zealand Baking Trade. _ ,. Enzployee'.._\ JUH' v General Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd ( 19~5 ) . counsel were set: tll i ngly not prep a reJ to adva nee the a rgurn en t that the co rll rn on law should not a p pI y ( p. l 2 7 per Thorp J ) .
Although sorne early cases involving inter-union disputes did invoke the con1n1on law. the first rnajor atternpt to raise the econornic torts in an industrial dispute was in two cases in ll)70. Pete:,· Towing Sl!n'ices v Northern JUW (the li rst. and one of the vel)' few cases that went to a full trial) and Flett\' Northern Transport Drivers IUH 1 (lhe lirst usc of an interirn injunction). The lav.· was consolidated a few years later in Northern Drivers JUW v Kawau Island Ferries Ltd ( 1974) when the Court ofAppcal upheld an interirn injunction issued against the union. In this case the appropriateness of the cornn1on law in the New Zealand industrial relations systen1 was not even debated. except for the defensive con11ncnt retlecting British views that:
The common law right to sue in re~pect of u nju t i fi~d in tcrferencc v. ith con tractua I relations i not peculiar to industrial disputes: it is available in all circumstance!) and to all people providing the requisite interference and absence ofjustification exist. (p. 620) With respect. it can he said that this case is rennukable for its industrial naivety in that it regan.Js the union·s defence of its n1en1bers as a "n1oral" duty and contrasts that with the .. legal rights .. ol the en1ployer. even while seen1ingly adrnitting that such rights were a .. contrivance .. to reduce rnanning levels. What is equally rcrnarkabk in the first Court of Appeal case on the use oft he econotnic torts in an industrial dispute is the Court's view that the substantive issues could he addressed at a full hearing. an event which the Court should have been aware was n1ost unlikelv to occur.
Tht'-1 case confirmed the availability ofthe con1rnon law remedies in tort and heralded the \.\a) for an increasing ~trean1 of intcrin1 injunctions being sought to inhibit strike action. particu I arly in the I ast f e\\ ) ea r' -1. In the last year or ~o en1 ploye rs have realised thee ffect that an action for darn ages rnay h cl\ con a union and have now initiated several actions a It hough none have yet gone to trial.
The effect of the law
To justify the above criticisrn of the Court ofAppeaL it is worth outlining the impact that the econon1ic torts had in labour law. As will he seen. the result was a major change throughout the systen1 as a whole.
(I)
The legislative policy of the last~ years. that industrial disputes should be settled by a specialist court with a jurisdiction adapted specifically for such disputes was reversed. Industrial disputes henceforth were able to be litigated in two court systems. Moreover the dual systen1 n1eant that the most effective ren1edies from an employer viewpoint were avai lab le in the court where. because of the nature of the usual remedy (an interim injunction) and the nature of the comn1on law rules, the industrial relations n1erits of the case were unlikely to he considered in any depth. (2) A new rernedy. and one that particularly favoured ernployers. was made available. a ren1ed) that had heen restricted in other jurisdictions for this reason (sec Anderson. llJ 75). This resulteJ in a n1ajor change in power relationships in industrial disputes (sec Hughe\. 19X6 for a recent analysis of interirn injunctions). (3) The possi hi I i ty of a potential con tlict between the legislation and the common law arose. The be\t exarnple of thi s was when the Industrial Relations Act 1973 ren1oved legal sanction\ from a I i n1 ited range of strikes over dispu tcs of interest. Such strikes however aln1ost certain!) remained unlawful at cornrnon law. A second example \Vas the provisions of the Com n1erce Act llJ75 to allow the Arbitral ion Court to deal with industria I action seriously affecting the public interest. The whole rationale of both the legis Ia tion anJ the polic) contained in it. that the .t\rhitration Court should deal \.Vith such disputes. seen1s to he rendered superfluous hy the parallel cornrnon law remedies. ( 4) The potentia I of the con1 n1on law for a concerted ern ployer attack on not only the right to strike hut on the right of an effective union to exist at all hecan1e apparent. The recent cases cia itn i ng su hsta n tia I dan1 ages against unions clearly den1onstrate this potentia I. The same threat also exists against union officia ls. These possibilities at best can have a n1ajor chi IIi ng effect once the threat hecon1es apparent and at worst threaten the viabi I ity o ft he union n1overnent. In 1986 New Zealand law was in a sin1 ilar .position to that of Britain before 1906. only with a n1uch n1ore developed and sophisticated con1mon law arsenal.
(5) The changes hrought ahout seem to go against the trend of development particularly since 195 1 which was one ofdefacto tolerance of strikes with a preference for solutions through industrial procedures.
It wa s only in 19S5 in New Zealand Baking Trad<:~ £mployee:1· /UW '' General Foods Corpora/ion (NZ) Ltd that the Court of Appeal finally began to consider seriously some oft he issues raised and at a tin1e when the proposed labour law reforrns were about to render the discussion redundant. The Court of Appeal in this case did recognise that issues of labour law should primarily he n:solved in the Arhitration Court. thus possihly limiting the trend towards seeking injunctions in the High Court to enforce the provisions oft he Industrial Relations Act. but wa s not prepared to go further and exclude access to the con1n1on law remedies. in particular interim injunctions. Given the fact that the common law had been used in this way since 1970 the reluctance to n1ake such a rnajor change is understandable. The Court did however scen1
alin~ to the prohlerns to a much greater extent that in 1974. Cooke J fOr example ~aid:
• There is some attraction in the approach that ... e\ en though a tort action has been brought properly before it. the High Court ~hould wash its hands of all res ponsibility for the time heing. and withhold any remedy until any case which happens to be pending in the Arbitration Court and has some link with the s ubject-matter of the High Court action has been disposed of. But that would he a radical change. having the effect of altering existing right!) 4U ite rauically . ( p. 11 X) ooke .J went on to stat~ that. given that the law has stood si nee 1974. any suc h c hange wou ld he "u nj u t i li~d j ud ici~d legislation ... The n1ajority j udgn1en ts also leave no doubt that the H igh ourt's jurisdiction to issue injunctions hascd on a tort rernains intact. In deed severa l of the judg~s cxplicitl; stat~ that the con1n1on law powers wou ld not h ave hee n cxd uded wi tho ut clear legislative wording (p. l l X per Cooke J a nd p. 125 per Sotne rs J ). It was also noted that counsel conced~d that the Court had jurisdiction (p. 127 per Thorp J ).
Richard on J \\as how~vcr prepared to go further and hold that norn1al ly the H igh Court should decline to grant injunctions in cases concerning industrial disputes for the reason that the Arbitr~ttion Court h~td hecn entrusted with jurisdiction in this area and that it had the spcci<tl expertise to deal \\ith such disputes. lie stated: the dominating consider~ttion is that the underl)ing indu~trial relation!' is~ues can and ~hould ht· <.ktermined first in the Arbitration Court. That Court ha!' the expertbe and. more important!). it lw~ been entrusted v.ith that re~p<>n!'ihility. (p. 1.::!1 ):
and ~tdded ho\\ lll1\atisf"~IL'tory it j~ to htt\L' the dctL'rmination of thL'SL' important isSUL'S of industrial relation~ Ia\\ lkalt \\ ith under thL' ad\L'fS(tr) proct·sses ofthL' H igh Court which has no role in that reg~trd lllhkr the lndu~trial Relations Act itselfin!'lcad of leaving them to the Arbitration Court .. . An) intrusion h) the High Court into industrial rl:'lations must detL'rmine to some extent the legi-.,l~tli\e policies untkrl)ing the Industrial Relations Act IY73 . (p. 1.::!2)
ThejudgmenbofCook.eJ and in particularRichardsonJ goson1ewa) towards recognising that the u e oft he con1n1on Ia\\ docs create prohlcrns in industrial relations. Neitherjudgn1ent hO\\e\er que!::ltion~ the ha~ic applicahility of tht con1n1on law. only the ju~tilication for granting injunction~ in particular circutnstances. a point that relates to judicial discretion rather than suh::itanti\ e bt\\ and on I~ o\ercotnes sorne oft he problcn1s listed a hove. The tnajor potential prohlctn of the in1pact of an {1\\ ard of datnagcs would not he affected.
Courts and politicians
The discussion aho\'e lend-.; to Slll!l!e~t that the courts should have resisted the introduction ..._._ of the econon1ic tort into e\\ l:ealand labour law. This point ren1ains valid. hut the extent to \\hich the courts could hc.t\e achie\ed thi~ i~ li1nitcd. If the courts had used thL' reasoning of Cooke and Richan.bon JJ in llJ / 4 the) could ha\e sc\ercly lin1ited the 4.1\ailahilit) or the interin1 injunction in indu~trial di~pute~ and ha\c thu~ forced the useofthe ren1cdic~ pro\ ided for in the Act. This \\ould ha\c been the 111o~t ~ensihle and achic\ahlt: 1neasun: and the one with the greate t practical in1pact in that it \\ould ha\e prcser\'~d the pre-llJ74.)tatusquo.
Beyond thi however. it is difficult to ~ee how rnuch 1norc could have been achieved. The econotnic torts ha\ e general applicabilit) and to ~uggest that they not apply in Ntw Zealand is u n rea I ist ic. There is howe\ ~r cons ider~1 h le scope for l h c courts to act in dcvclopi ng the poss i h k dt: fences to an action in tort ~o as to ta k.e <~ccou n t of indus tria I rei a tions reality. For ex a tn pic the Lkf~nce oflegitin1ate self-interest a\ail~1bk in conspirac) could well have been generalised. Indeed in Pete's ToH 'ing Sen'iCl!S \' .\'urthcrn IUJV Speight J did take son1e cognizance or the tndustri~d r~l,ttions realities in accepting a defcnL·e ofju~tilication to an action for induce1nent to breach or con tract.
The dirtiLulties in the\\ a) of such a de\'eloptnent arc ho\\Cver considerable and would require a n1ajur ~hift in the concepts underl) ing the econotnic torts. In particular the preerninence given to the lawfulness or unla\\ fulness 6 of the action con1plained of as the ha~is of liahilit) \\Ould need to be re-evaluated and the ernpha is shifted to the rcasonahlt:nes~ of the action. Such a 1najor change is extrernel) unlike!) gi\ en the constraints that operate to lirnit judicial Ia\\ tnaking. A con1plicating factor in C\\ Zealand is that the unlawfulness would often he because the action was contrary to industrial relations legislation. A change as suggested would therefore scen1 to rnean not ahstentionisn1 by the con1n1on law. hut opposition ~o legisla_tivc policy which would be untenable.
P~rhaps it is 1nore sensible to ask why the (iovernrnent did not act to dea l with the problen1s raised. The an~wers arc probahly that it would have alienated governn1en t supporters. that the
()
Lawfulness can indude a hrl!ach of contract. a tort or a breach of!'ltatute. It should not be e4uated with criminal conJuct (although criminal conduct is also unlawful in this context).
possibility of an attack on ~trikes and unions was not an unwelco~e dcvelop~e~t and pa~ly that the mythology of placing a group .. above the law" was suffictently convtnctng to JUStify tnachon. Such rca~on~ are only rational in political terms and not in terms of coherent and sen~ible lawmaking o r indu')trial relati o ns policy. This is particularly so given the titning of the events which occu rred at the sa me time as a general reforn1 oflabour law and, in some cases at least see med to he in conflict with it.
The Labour Relations Act
The Labour Relations Act 1987 has given statutory recognition to the place of tort in labour law and has moved it to centre stage in industrial disputes. These reforms do ameliorate some of the problems that have arisen since 1970 but the problems inherent in the common law have not been tackled and the new stru cture itself proceeds on some debatable assumptions.
Jurisdiction in tort
The major problem the Act has solved is that of dual jurisdiction, as the Labour Court is given exclusive JUri sdiction over the principal economic torts where an industrial action is involved (~242). While a potential residual jurisdiction remains with the High Court it is unlikely that this will po~e problems. and especially in interlocutory proceedings the High Court may now be reluctant to become involved given the adequacy of the remedies available tn the Labo ur Court. The transfer of jurisdiction has not however been accompanied by any refo rm of the co mmon lav.-1tselfand a~ the Labour Court is unable to use its equity and good co nscien ce JUrisdiction in tort actions. the benefits of the transfer of jurisdiction may well be limited 1n that the speciali sed expertise oft he Labour Court may not be able to be fully utilised (s 279(4). In both tort action" and in applications for a compliance order the Labour Court will con~ist of a Judge sitting alone In the former case however the Court will be required to observe the accepted legal principle~ relating to the granting of interim injunctions. A proposal that the equity and good co nsc1encej uri <idiction should apply to such actions Y..as deleted by the Select Comm tttee. The removal of thi <; provi"ton is significant as it would have allowed the Court considerab ly more di~cretton in deciding whether to i~sue an injunction and in particular a greater ability to con~ider the industrial relation s issues which. although given so me recogniti o n tn some cases. tend to he see n as subsidiary to the central question of whether an 1njunction ~h ou ld he i~s ued The equity and good con~cience pro\ ision will apply to applications fo r compliance o rder~.
The second major reform in the Act is that the situation where a strike permitted by statute co uld well he unlawful at co mmon law ha<; been remedied . The Act noY.. provides a definition of lawful and unlawful c;trikes (ss [233] [234] and provides that no action founded on the listed torts may brought tn re')pect of a lawful strike
A balance of retnedies?
The sc hem e of the new Act places a n1uch greater en1pha!<!is on the econon1ic torts as a primary remedy in industrial disputes, a policy that would seen1 to give a statutory recognition to o ne of the inherent features in the common law, its bias towards employers. This bias is apparent 1n two features of th e law . First the tests used in deciding whether or not an interim injunction s hould be granted tend to favour the interests of the en1ployer {sec Hughes. 1986) a nd seco ndly the potential lor dan1ages g1ve~ the employer a sa nction that is not available to union" and wh 1ch threaten " the effecti\ eness and" ia bili t) of any union involved. It is interesttng that the legtslatio n has not follo""ed th e British '\Cht;n1e of setting lirnits on the damages that can he awan.led whtch vary w1th the si1e ot the unto n.s With sn1all and relatively poor unions. the threat of the personal liability of union officials in New Zealand is also a real probletn, a threat that would be in conceivable against an employer representative.
The 1~sue of'-"' hcther a unton ca n in fact use ren1edies in tort is a third feature that should be con~id e red . Even if an en1plo)er's action in a lockout is tortious, a debatable question, the availability of ren1ed ies is que tionable. The tnajor loss is 1 ikely to be wages but section 238 provide~ \vage an~ nol payable during a lockout. seen1 ingly regardle!js of its la\vful ness 9 , and in any case this is a lo to the worker. not the union. In the absense of real lo s neither an injunction nor darnages \VoulJ scern to be available.
In practice. a union will probabl) need to rely on a con1pliancc order. an order ~' here the Court's full indu trial dLcretion is available. The real problen1 however relates to unlawful strikes where the lack of balance derives from a rigid adherence to dispute procedures which will usually favour the ernployer. partly because of the management values supported by the courts but also because such procedures usually confirn1 the employers actions until a dispute is resolved. Even where a union is successful the ren1edies will not usually fully restore its position and any SULCess rnay be negatived by the .. chilling .. effect given by the initial advantage (on this effect in disrnissal cases see G las beck. l9R4. pp. 138-141 ). The essential fallacy in the new schen1e is to equate strikes and lockouts. The major source of en1ployer power lies in n1anagerial prerogative and the new Act deliberately bolsters this power by reinforcing it with particularly powerful ren1edies through the law of tort.
Conclusion
. This discussion has. it is hoped. demonstrated that the use of the econon1ic torts in New Zealand is an area that poses serious theoretical questions for the overall structure of our labour law. The e qu~stions go not only to the root of labour law but to the way in which the New Zealand courts derive the common law fron1 foreign sources. "'It is suggested that the techniques and pri nci pies ofconunon law tra nsplan tabili ty require judicial rc-exa m i nation in areas where obviously different political and social factors are at work and that this is particularly so where there has been extensive legislative intervention in the area of law under examination.
More in1portantly. from an immediate point of vie~'. is the suggestion that the economic torts have been us~d in a conscious or unconscious atten1pt to effect a major shift of power in New Zealand industrial relations so as to con1pel the union movement into a legalistic straitjacket that will seriously weaken their industrial power and consequently the protection they can give their members. The Labour Relations Act 1987 shows a n1ajor shift in preference towards legalistic solutions to industrial disputes accompanied by a weakening of the tripartite nature of the Court. There are few exan1ples in the world to indicate that such trends will do anything other than weaken the position of workers.
